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In Board of Curators of the University of Missouri v. Horowitz' the
United States Supreme Court rejected the argument that public university
students are constitutionally entitled to a hearing prior to their dismissal
from school for academic reasons. In ruling against a former medical
student at the University of Missouri-Kansas City, 2 the Court con-
cluded that "the determination whether to dismiss a student for academic
reasons requires an expert evaluation of cumulative information and is not
readily adapted to the procedural tools of judicial or administrative
decisionmaking. ' 3 In this article that conclusion and the several opinions
in Horowitz will be analyzed and criticized; questions left unanswered by
the Horowitz decision and the possibility of nonconstitutional student
protection will also be explored.4
* B.A., Macalester College, 1973; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1976; staff counsel. National
Education Association. The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect the positions or
policies of the National Education Association.
1. 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
2. In her final year of study Charlotte Horowitz was dismissed from the University of Missur-
Kansas City Medical School for allegedly failing to satisfy the school's academic requirements. During
her first year of study, several faculty members had "expressed dissatisfaction with her clinical
performance during a pediatrics rotation. The faculty members noted that [her] 'performance was
below that of her peers in all clinical patient-oriented settings,' that she was erratic in her attendance at
clinical sessions, and that she lacked a critical concern for personal hygiene," 435 tS. at 81. Ms.
Horowitz' dismissal followed when her second-year performance wai not deemed to have shown the
"radical improvement" required by the Medical School's Council on Evaluation. Il
Ms. Horowitz then filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) claiming that the dismissal
violated her fourteenth amendment rights to procedural and substantive due process. Alter a bench
trial the district court entered judgment for the defendants. Horowitt v. Curators ofthe University of
Missouri, No. 74CV47-W-3 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 14, 1975).
3. 435 U.S. at 90. The majority therefore determined that "considering all relevant factors,
including the evaluative nature of the inquiry and the significant and historically supported interest of
the school in preserving its present framework for academic evaluations, a hearing is not required by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 435 U.S. at 86 n,3.
The right to some form of notice prior to dismissal is not specifically addressed by the thorowltz
majority, but at least one court has concluded that students are entitled to notice prior to an academic
dismissal despite the inapplicability of any procedural hearing requir.-ments, Gasparv. Bruton. 513
F.2d 843, 851 (10th Cir. 1975) ("All that is required is that the student be made aware prior to
termination of his failure or impending failure to meet those [minimum academic] standards,"), Set'
also Drown v. Portsmouth School Dist., 435 F.2d 1182 (ist Cir. 1970). ,'crt. denied. 402 t1,S. 972 (197 1)
(teacher entitled to written explanation of dismissal, but not to hearin-), It is likely that most students
will receive such notice in any event, and the practical utility of the notice is now limited to possible use
as a basis for a later court challenge to the dismissal as"arbitrary. capricious or in bad faith," Sec text
accompanying notes 36-45 infra.
4. For pre-Horowitz commentaries on constitutional due process rights in academic dismissals
from institutions of higher education, see Dessem. Student Due Process Rght in ,,lcaminit.
Dismissalsfrom the Public Schools. 5 J. L. & EDuc. 277 (1976); Note, Due" Proce% and the (Itnivcrsii
Student: The Academic/DisciplinarY Dichotomy, 37 LA. L. RMv 939 (1977) [hereinalter cited as Note.
Due Process and the University Student], Note, Due Process in Academic Dismi3 sals front Pot
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I. THE NEW FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD:
A DECISION COMPRISED OF DICTA
Prior to any discussion of the individual issues or opinions in
Horowitz, it is important to recognize the common thread running
through both the majority and minority opinions in the case: regardless of
the individual Justices' conclusions on the general question of student due
process rights in academic dismissals, all members of the Court agreed that
Charlotte Horowitz had received a full and fair predismissal hearing. As
Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority, "Assuming the existence of a
liberty or property interest, respondent has been awarded at least as much
due process as the Fourteenth Amendment requires." 5
Despite the fact that all of the Justices agreed that Charlotte Horowitz
had received full procedural due process from the defendant university,
6
seven members of the Court chose to express an opinion on whether the
Constitution generally requires a public university to afford students any
type of hearing prior to their expulsion or separation from the university
for academic reasons. 7 The majority's dictum that the fourteenth amend-
ment does not require such a hearing8 therefore constitutes a breach of the
Secondary Schools, 26 CATH. U. L. REv. 111 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Note, Due Process in
Academic Dismissals].
5. 435 U.S. at 84-85.
6. The Supreme Court determined that, "The ultimate decision to dismiss respondent %%as
careful and deliberate." 435 U.S. at 85. A majority of the doctors who evaluated Horowit" clinical
competence, however, did not vote for her dismissal as opposed to voting that she not be graduated in
the spring of 1973 (with the possibility of continued study and eventual graduation left open). Ofthe
seven doctors who evaluated her clinical proficiency, only two recommended that she be immediately
dropped from the medical school, while two others recommended that she be graduated on schedule in
June 1973. The three remaining physicians recommended that Horowitz not be graduated on
schedule but be continued on academic probation. 435 U.S. at 81.
On May 7, 1973, Charlotte Horowitz was notified by the dean of her medical school that she would
not be allowed to graduate on schedule in June 1973. Therefore, despite the fact thatshehad received
credit for all courses completed prior to the decision that she would not graduate, she was notified of
her dismissal. This decision was reached without any prior notice to Horowitz or opportunity for her
to state her case. 435 U.S. at 82.
Judge Ross, writing for the Eighth Circuit panel which unanimously concluded that Charlotte
Horowitz had been denied due process, described what he perceived to be a critical defect in the
dismissal:
The parties agree that the appeal procedure, involving tests administered by the panel of
seven doctors, related only to the decision not to graduate Horowitz, and not to the decision
to expel her. Nevertheless, we doubt that this procedure would satisfy the requirement of
due process, since the panel itself was only an examining board without any po% erexcept the
power to make recommendations to another body [the university's Council on Evaluation]
which also had only that same power.
Horowitz v. Board of Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 538 F.2d 1317, 1321 n.4 (8th Cir. 1976),ret'd,435
U.S. 78 (1978).
7. Justice Blackmun, in an opinion joined by Justice Brennan, found it"unnecessary . . . to
indulge in the arguments and counterarguments contained in the two opinions as to the extent or type
of procedural protection that the Fourteenth Amendment requires in the graduate school-dismisal
situation" since all members of the Court agreed that Charlotte Horowitz had "received all the
procedural process that was due her under the Fourteenth Amendment." 435 U.S. at 109.
8. "We conclude that considering all relexant factors, including the caluatite nature of the
inquiry and the significant and historically supported interest of the school in preser ing its present
framework for academic evaluations, a hearing is not required by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment." 435 U.S. at 86 n.3.
OHIO STATE LA W JOURNAL [Vol. 39:470
rule of judicial self-restraint that "[t]he Court will not 'anticipate a
question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.' "'
The statement that procedural due process is inapplicable to academic
dismissals is not the only major dictum contained in Justice Rehnquist's
majority opinion. Near the end of that opinion Justice Rehnquist asserted
in dictum that "judicial intrusion into academic decisionmaking" should
be curtailed even when a student alleges that his or her dismissal was
violative of substantive due process.'( The Justice then added a final
major dictum that a state university's failure to follow its own rules is not a
constitutional violation." These three major dicta will now be consi-
dered.
A. The Evaluative Nature of the Dismissal Decision
and the Issue of Academic Expertise
The ratio decidendi of the majority opinion in Horowitz is not the
absence of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest in
academic dismissal situations.' 2  The decision turns, rather, on "the
evaluative nature of the [predismissal] inquiry and the historically
supported interest of the school in preserving its present framework for
academic evaluations."' 3  These two factors-the evaluative nature of the
dismissal decision and the advisability of keeping this decision-making
process within the academic institution-thus weighed so heavily in the
majority's balancing of competing interests 4 that, even assuming the
9. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288. 346 (1936) (Brandeis. J., concurring),
Justice Rehnquist's dictum regarding the procedural due process rights of students also conflicts with
two other principles of constitutional adjudication enunciated by Justice Brandeis in his A biandelr
opinion. These are, namely, that the Court "will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law hroader
than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied' " and that the Court "will not pa.ss upon
a constitutional question ... if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may he
disposedof." Id.at347. Although Justice Rehnquist has himself recogniled the inappropriateness of
"sweeping pronouncement[s]" unnecessary to the disposition of the specific case before the Court.
Aldinger v. Howard. 427 U.S. I, 18 (1976), he has been criticized for failing to consistently adhere to
this principle. Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Prelfininary View, 90 HARv. L. RI v.' 293, 341-49
(1976).
10. 435 U.S. at 92.
II. Id. at 92 n.8.
12. The majority opinion "[a]ssum[ed] the existence ofa liberty or property intcrest."I.L at 84-85.
The Court therefore implicitly recogniied that the evaluatise nature of the dismissid decision and tle
expertise of school authorities in making such decisions are factors affecting the loin: of any due
process hearing rather than the existence of a constitutional due process interest in the first intlance.
As the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded in a case concerning an academic dismissal from a
medical school's psychiatric residency program. "[s]chool officials have a strong interest in freedom
from outside intervention in matters of academic evaluation in order to maintain the integrity of tle
academic process. This interest does not, however, defeat the threshold determination as the
applicability of the Due Process Clause," Navato v. Sletten. 560 F.2d 340, 345 (th Cir. 1977).
13. 435 U.S. at 86 n.3.
14. Id. See also Mathews v. Eldridge. 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976):
[Olur prior decisions indicate that identification of the specifi. dictates o1 due process
generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First. the private interest that will he
affected by the official action: second, the risk of an erroneous de'privation ol such interest
through the procedures used. and the probable value, if any, of additional or substittite
procedural safeguards: and finally, the Government's interest, including the lunction
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existence of otherwise constitutionally protected interests, the Court
refused to require any due process protections prior to academic dismis-
sal. 5
The first basis for the majority's refusal to afford procedural protec-
tions to students threatened with academic dismissal-"the evaluative
nature of the [predismissal] inquiry"-is undeniably a strong argument for
not requiring the full panoply of procedural safeguards applicable to other
governmental decision-making in the school dismissal decision. The
inappropriateness of such plenary protections 6 does not mean, however,
that other, more appropriate protections cannot be molded by the courts"
(or, preferably, by the public universities themselves't ) or that Charlotte
Horowitz was not at a minimum "entitled to be informed of the reasons for
her dismissal and to an opportunity personally to state her side of the
story."'
19
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion also assumes that all dismissals
which a college or university labels "academic" involve solely subjective
and evaluative decisions. However, as Justice Marshall pointed out in his
dissent,
[w]hether [Charlotte Horowitz'] inadequacies can be termed "pure academic
reasons" . . . is ultimately an irrelevant question, and one placing an undue
emphasis on words rather than functional considerations. The relevant
point is that respondent was dismissed largely because of her conduct,just as
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute proce-
dural requirement would entail.
15. Cf. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 682-83 n.55 (1977), in whichJustice Powell concluded
that the absence of "manageable standards for determining what process is due in a particular
case .. . illustrates the hazards of ignoring the traditional solution of the common law" and of
recognizing a constitutional right to a hearing. Thus the Supreme Court, in a ruling not dissimilar
from the majority opinion in Horowitz, found that the unique position of public secondary schools
made due process hearings prior to the imposition of corporal punishment inappropriate, despite the
finding that a fourteenth amendment liberty interest was implicated by such punishment.
16. Compare Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484-90 (1972) (comprehensive procedures
mandated for parole revocation) and Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,266-71 (1970) (comprehensive
procedures mandated for termination of welfare benefits) with Goss v. Lopez. 419 U.S. 565. 577-84(1975) ("rudimentary precautions" required prior to school disciplinary dismissals).
17. See. e.g., Kirp. Proceduralism and Bureaucracy: Due Process in the School Setting. 28 STAN.
L. REv. 841 (1976). Roger Cramton has suggested that alternative modes of administrative decision-
making be evaluated on the basis of their accuracy, effici.ncy. and acceptability rather than upon the
traditional notions of due process against which trial-type hearings are usually measured. Cramton. A
Comment on Trial-Type Hearings in Nuclear Power Plant Siting, 58 VA. L. REv. 585 (1972). Due
process itself. "unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to
time, place and circumstances." Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath. 341 U.S. 123. 162
(1951) (Frankfurter, J.. concurring), but instead requires notice and hearing "appropriate to the
nature of the case." Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306,313 (1950).
18. -[T]he courts must be given guidance by the academic community: they can hardly be
expected to be experts on the needs and circumstances of that community and its judicial processes."
Fisk, A Srstem of Law for the Campus: Some Reflections. 38 GEO. WAsii. L. REv. 1006. 1020 (1970).
However, once dismissal procedures are promulgated, universities should be held to those procedures
under state or federal constitutional law, contract law, or the law of pri%ate associations. See text
accompanying notes 46-56 & 69-95 ifra.
19. Board of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowit? 435 U.S. 78. 97 (1978) (White. J..
concurring in part and concurring in thejudgment).
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the students in Goss [v. Lopez20 ] weresuspended because of their conduct. 2'
Thus, even accepting the majority's premise that hearings are inappro-
priate for reaching evaluative or subjective decisions, the right to a dismis-
sal hearing should not turn upon whether the hearing is termed "academic"
or "disciplinary," but rather upon whether the proposed dismissal is, at
least in part, for conduct-related reasons presenting a factual dispute
susceptible of resolution by a third party.22 It remains to be seen whether
the lower federal courts will consider a school's characterization of a
dismissal as "academic" to be conclusive in all cases.23
Although Justice Rehnquist attempted in Horowitz to distinguish
Goss v. Lopez24 as a case in which "the school's decision to suspend the
students rested on factual conclusions . . . ,,5 the Court in Goss
recognized the right of a student "to characterize his conduct and put it in
what he deems the proper context. 26  Even in the absence of a factual
20. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
21. 435 U.S. at 104 (footnotes omitted). Justice Marshall also pointed out that "[t]he [state and
lower federal court] decisions on which the Court relies . . . plainly use the term'academic'in a much
narrower sense than does the Court, distinguishing 'academic' dismissals from ones based on
'misconduct' and holding that, when a student is dismissed for failing grades, a hearing would serve no
purpose." 435 U.S. at 105 (footnote omitted). Officials of the Universit, of Missouri had themselves
framed the issue of Charlotte Horowitz' failings as "not one o1 academic achlevetlnnt, but of
performance, relationship to people and ability to communicate. . . . (emphasis added)." 435 U.S. at
103.
22. The reliance upon labels such as "academic" or"disciplinary" to determine the applicability
of procedural protections permits "defensive bureaucratic behavior" (with a consequent denial of
student rights) such as has been predicted in the case of disciplinary suspensions from secondary
schools: "[Nullification of the right to due process hearings] could be accomplished by altering the
substantive bases for suspension; for example, identifying 'insubordination' and not some more
objective and specifiable mischief as justifiable basis for discipline would effectively disable a student
from disputing the matter." Kirp, supra note 17, at 862.
23 The line between academic and disciplinary dismissals may be assuming less practical
significance, however, since proof of actual injury is now a prereqjisite to recovery of more than
nominal damages in actions against school authorities for denial of disciplinary, dismissal hearings.,
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978), and because the Horowitz majority has minimized the scope of
the hearings mandated by Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975): "All that Goss required was an'informal
give-and-take' between the student and the administrative body dismissing him . . , ." 435 U.S. at
86. Indeed, one might ask whether it is significant for the future of the Goss disciplinary hearing
requirement that Justice Stevens, the fifth member of the Horowitz majority, has taken Justice
Douglas' seat on the Court, Douglas having been the fifth member of the Goss majority. The scope of
the Goss opinion has also been limited by subsequent Supreme Court decisions rejecting claims of
allegedly unconstitutional governmental stigmatization. E.g., Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624 (1977);
Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
24. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
25. 435 U.S. at 89.
26. 419 U.S. at 584. "This opportunity [to be heard] is no less important when, as here, there Is
not a serious dispute over the factual basis for the charge, for'. . . things are not always as they seem
to be, and the student will at least have the opportunity to characterize his conduct and put it in what he
deems the proper context.'" Strickland v. Inlow, 519 F.2d 744,746 (8th Cir. 1975) (quoting Goss v.
Lopez, 423 U.S. 565 (1975)).
Professor Tribe has argued that the right to be heard is "ultimately more understandable as
inherent in decent treatment than as optimally designed to minimize mistakes." L. TRInC, ANERItCAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 10-15, at 554 (1978). Cf. Joint Anti-Fasci.t Refugee Comm. v. McGrath,
341 U.S. 123, 171-72 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring):
The validity and moral authority of a conclusion largely depend upon the mode by which it
was reached. . . . No better instrument has been devised for arriving at truth than to give a
person in jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case against him and opportunity to inet it.
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dispute, the opportunity to characterize his or her conduct prior to
academic dismissal would allow a student to bring mitigating circumstan-
ces, such as illness or family problems, to the attention of school
authorities. An academic dismissal hearing would also provide the
student with a chance to discuss sanctions short of dismissal (for instance,
academic probation or remedial work) or the terms of the dismissal (such
as the possibility of later readmittance or of retaking failed examinations
or courses).27
The second basis for the majority's conclusion that due process
protections are inapplicable to academic dismissals is that public school
authorities possess expertise in academic matters and therefore should not
be interfered with by the courts.28  An observation of Judge David
Bazelon about judicial competence in the area of mental health may be
paraphrased as a rebuttal to Horowitz' deference to academic expertise:
[D]iffidence in the face of [academic] expertise is conduct unbecoming a
court. Very few judges are [educational experts]. But equally few are
economists, aeronautical engineers, atomic scientists, or marine biologists.
For some reason, however, many people seem to accept judicial scrutiny of,
say, the effect of a proposed dam on fish life, while they reject similar scrutiny
of [academic matters] ....
It is often unclear precisely what scope of review is appropriate, or what
result such review demands. But the principle of a division of responsibility
between administrators skilled in their area and judges skilled in the law is
clear and has proved workable.29
This division of responsibility and of expertise is indeed the key tojudicial
Nor has a better way been found for generating the feeling, so important to a popular
government, that justice has been done.
27. Several United States courts of appeals have recognized the value of due process hearings
in allowing a student threatened with disciplinary dismissal to argue for mitigation of punishment.
Hatch v. Goerke, 502 F.2d 1189, 1195 (10th Cir. 1974); Hagopian v. Knowlton, 470 F.2d 201,211 (2d
Cir. 1972); Betts v. Board of Educ.,466 F.2d 629,633 (7th Cir. 1972) (dictum). Seealso Dessem,supra
note 4, at 297-98; Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 634 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("In short, the
purpose of .. . [an employment dismissal] hearing, as is true of any other hearing which must
precede a deprivation of liberty, is two-fold: first to establish the truth or falsity of the charge, and
second, to provide a basis for deciding what action is warranted by the facts.").
28. In another opinion for the Court in the 1977-78 term, Justice Rehnquist has generally
criticized judicial policy-making or "judicial intervention [into areas of administrative expertise] run
riot," Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S.
519, 557 (1978), and Justice Powell (a former school board member) has consistently argued that the
nation's schools must be run by local educators without interference from the courts. See Wilkinson,
Goss v. Lopez: The Supreme Court as School Superintendent, 1975 Sup. CT. REv. 25,45 (1975) ("Mr.
Justice Powell's posture in Goss and in Woodv. Strickland reflects what is becoming a most prominent
theme of his tenure: the determination to contain constitutional interference with the operations ofthe
public schools.").
29. Bazelon, Implementing the Right to Treatment, 36 U. C. L. REv. 742,743-44 (1969). See
also the entry of one of Judge Bazelon's colleagues, Judge Wright, into another area of academic
expertise in Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967) and the criticisms of that decision.
Note, Hobson v. Hansen: Judicial Supervision ofthe Color-Blind School Board, 81 HARv. L. REV.
1511 (1968); Recent Developments, Hobson v. Hansen: The De Facto Limits on Judicial Power, 20
STAN. L. REv. 1249 (1968).
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review of academic or other nonjudicial decision-making. The recogni-
tion of a right to academic dismissal hearings in Horowitz would not have
taken courts beyond their own area of expertise in the enunciation and
protection of procedural rights; the effect instead would merely have been
to require schools to actually exercise their acknowledged academic ex-
pertise by holding such academic dismissal hearings.
A majority of the Supreme Court has now rejected this argument,
however, even though the potential number of academic dismissal hear-
ings involved would probably have been less than the number of disci-
plinary hearings now required by Goss v. Lopez.30 Furthermore, such
hearings would not have challenged the authority, character-shaping
goals, or need for order of a college or university as court-mandated
disciplinary hearings may in public secondary schools.3' Since an
affirmance of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Horowitz would most
likely not have resulted in the number of "judicial interventions" into the
schools as are currently mandated by Goss, and since the Horowitz
majority itself recognized that any such "interventions" would be to
protect a significantly more important student interest than is protected by
secondary school disciplinary hearings,32 the qualitative differences in such
hearings-and in the processes of secondary and higher education in this
country-must explain the Supreme Court's refusal to extend the
rationale of Goss to academic failure in higher education.33
While dismissal from a college or university is more serious to the
student involved than a short suspension from secondary school, the
30. See Dessem, supra note 4, at 300 n.136. "Currently, approximately 10 percent of all junior
and senior high school students are so disciplined [by suspensions of the type discussed in Goss] at least
once during the school year." Kirp, supra note 17, at 850.
Compare these findings with the statistics on the percent of students completing their freshman
year of college in good academic standing contained in COLLEGE ENTRANCE EXAMINATION BOARD, Tilt
COLLEGE HANDBOOK (16th ed. 1977) (e.g., Bryn Mawr College, 99%; University of Michigan, 97%;
University of Dayton, 90%; University of Arizona, 80%). "[T]he rate of attrition in U.S. medical
schools is [even] low[er than that of undergraduate institutions]-les., than 5 percent." ASSOCIATION
OF AMERICAN MEDICAL COLLEGES, MEDICAL SCHOOL ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS 1978-79 44 (28th cd,
1977). The number of actual separations for academic reasons is "uncommonly small" at many
medical schools; in recent academic years at the Case Western Reserve University School of Medicine
there have sometimes been no academic separations and never more than two such dismissals (out of a
total school enrollment in excess of 500 students). Conversation of June 8, 1978 with Dean Daniel L.
Horrigan of the Case Western Reserve University School of Medicine.
31. See Kirp, supra note 17, at 853-59. It also seems likely that while the residents and taxpayers
cf some communities may consider the requirements of Goss to be a threat to their local control of
public elementary and secondary schooli, tHe average state citizen-not being as'directly involved in
the governance of state colleges and universities as in the control of local elementary and secondary
schools-would not have considered the requirement of academic dismissal hearings an unjustifiable
judicial intrusion into public higher education.
32. 435 U.S. at 86 n.3. Cf. Dessem, supra note 3, at 287 n.74. Although the weight of the
private interest at stake is not relevant to the existence of a consttutionally protected liberty or
property interest, Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,570-71 (1972), "a weighing process has long
been a part of any determination of theform of hearing required in particular situations by procedural
due process." Id. at 570. See also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,334 (1976).
33. Another possible explanation is that a majority ofthe present Justices are unconvinced of the
correctness of the Goss decision itself. See note 23 supra.
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interests of the college or university-and of society at large-in producing
capable graduates and professionals is much more important also. The
requirement of due process is not without its potential costs: "the discre-
tion that due process checks may well be the handmaiden of arbitrariness;
it may equally well be prerequisite to the maintenance of institutional
excellence. ' 34  The Supreme Court in Horowitz has concluded that the
constitutional recognition of academic due process rights for students is
incompatible with the discretion necessary for institutional excellence and
has, therefore, struck the balance in favor of academic discretion over
procedural safeguards.35
B. Judicial Protection from Substantive Due Process Violations
Not only did the Horowitz Court conclude that procedural due
process protections are inapplicable when a school dismissal is based upon
academic deficiencies, but Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion closes
with an admonition against "judicial intrusion into academic decision-
making" to review substantive due process challenges to university
dismissals.36 The Court's own dictum on this point brushes aside as
"dictum of a number of lower courts '37 an established line of cases- both
federal and state-recognizing the right to judicial review of allegedly
"arbitrary, capricious, or bad faith" academic dismissals from public
higher education 8 and was offered despite the fact that the court of appeals
had not had a chance to consider the question in the first instance.39
If a school's characterization of a dismissal as "academic" is deemed
sufficient to immunize even substantive due process violations from
judicial scrutiny, problems will be created for both students and the lower
34. Kirp, supra note 17, at 874.
35. The Horowitz majority also suggested that even allegedly "arbitrarv. cavricious or bad faith"
dismissals are not to be subject to stringent judicial review. 435 U.S. at 92. See text accompanying
notes 36-45 infra.
36. 435 U.S. at 92.
The substantive due process claims of Horowitz include(d] the failure of the Medical School
to follow its own rules and regulations in dismissing her, the decision to exclude Horowitz
from the option of extending her education at the School even though that option was offered
to other students, the alteration by the School of the standards by which Horowitz was
evaluated and the expostfacto application of new standards to the performance of Horowitz,
the discriminatory evaluation of Horowitz based upon her sex and ph)sical appearance, and
the arbitrary nature of the assessment of her clinical competence.
Brief for Respondent at 42, Board of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78(1978).
Her counsel argued that even if the Supreme Court did not recognize a right to academic dismissal
hearings in all cases, Charlotte Horowitz' dismissal had been so arbitrarily conducted that she was
entitled to such a hearing.
37. 435 U.S. at 91.
38. See the cases collected and discussed in Dessem, supra note 4. Even though the federal
district judge who tried her case ruled that Charlotte Horowitz had no right to an academic dismissal
hearing, he explicitly recognized that "[i]f the student was actually expelled for reasons other than the
quality of his work or if the student failed because of bad faith or arbitrary or capricious action by an
instructor, the courts will order the granting of a fair and impartial hearing." Horowitzv. Curators of
the Univ. of Mo., No. 74CV47-W-3 at 19-20 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 14, 1975).
39. 538 F.2d at 1321 n.5.
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federal courts. The distinction of academic from nonacademic bases for
dismissal is often difficult, especially in professional schools where part of
the educational experience consists of clinical training and socialization in
the norms of the profession. May a medical student now be dismissed
without a hearing for criticizing policies of the American Medical Associa-
tion (thereby creating friction with medical colleagues and interfering with
the student's ability to become "a good medical doctor")? Can personal
hygiene be considered an academic factor in the dismissal of law students
or Ph.D. candidates as it apparently can be by medical schools?40 Al-
though clearly conduct-related and seemingly "arbitrary, capricious or in
bad faith" on their face, such factors could also be considered "academic"
in the broadest sense of the word.4'
The lower federal and state courts should reject such characteriza-
tions and continue to review dismissals in which officials of the defendant
university have acted "arbitrarily, capriciously or in bad faith." Since
such action, if established, is, in effect, action based on other than
academic considerations, 42 the Horowitz majority's deference to academic
expertise should not bar judicial scrutiny. Proof that a student has been
dismissed for nonacademic reasons should, therefore, still entitle that
student to a fair hearing conducted within the university;41 once the
university employs bona fide academic criteria to determine whether to
dismiss a student, the judicial inquiry is at an end.44 The state and lower
federal courts should preserve this limited judicial protection-that
"academic" dismissals are actually for academic reasons-and should not
consider Justice Rehnquist's passing dictum in Horowitz to be a rejection
of the established judicial oversight of substantive due process violations in
the nation's public colleges and universities.
40. 435 U.S. at 91 n.6.
41. Cf. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563. 567 (1968) (public high school teacher
dismissed when publication in local paper of his letter critici'ing ,chool administration lotnd
"detrimental to the best interests of the schools"), Dixon v. Alabama State Bd, 1 Ldue.. 294 l,2d 151.
152 n.2. ceri. denied. 368 U.S. 930 (1961) (students dismissed "[1for Conduct Prejudicial to the School
and for Conduct Unbecoming a Student").
42. Note. Due Process and the University Student. supra note 4. at 947.
43. The traditional remedy for an arbitrary, capricious or bad faith academic dismivsal is a lair
hearing conducted by the university rather than judicial reinstatement ol the dismissed student, See
Connelly v. University of Vt. and State Agric. College, 244 F. Supp. 156. 161 (1), Vt, 1965) ("should the
plaintiff prevail on the issue ofwhether the defendant acted arbitrarily. capriciously or in bad faith. this
Court will then order the defendant University to give the plaintiffa lair and impartial hearing on his
dismissal order."). See also Dessem. supra note 4.
44. Consider, however, the suggestion that "there may be rare occ, sions %%hen administra-
tive hostility to students' procedural due process rights could . . . lead cotirts to reinstatle sttdents
directly rather than go through the further delay of a second school hearing." l)essem. %tra note 4,at
289 n.82.
45. Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Horowitz cites. \ithout specifically critici/ing. tile eae ol
Greenhill v. Bailey, 519 F.2d 5,7 (8th Cir. 1975). relied upon b the Eighth Circuit Court ol Appeals in
Horowitz. In Greenhill the administration of the University of lona notified the Association ol
American Medical Colleges of the student's dismissal, noting that the apparent reason for is. lailure
was "lack of intellectual ability or insufficient preparation," The Eighth Circuit lound that tle
defendant university had unconstitutionally breached a fourteenth amendment liberty interest ol the
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C. A University's Failure to Follow Its Own Rules
The final significant dictum in the majority opinion, and the dictum of
perhaps greatest significance outside the area of educational law, is Justice
Rehnquist's statement in the last footnote of his opinion that a state
university's failure to follow its own rules in dismissing a student for
academic reasons does not violate the United States Constitution. 46 Inthe
cases of United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughness 1 and Service v.
Dulles48 the Supreme Court had established more than two decades ago
the principle that federal administrative agencies are bound by their own
rules and regulations. In its final dictum the Horowitz Court distin-
guished these cases as "enunciat[ing] principles of federal administrative
law rather than of constitutional law binding upon the States."' 9
Although the requirement that public bodies follow their own rules is
most frequently discussed in relation to federal administrative agencies,50
some courts have recognized a more general rule of law that"an organiza-
tion may create procedural rights in addition to the constitutional min-
imum where its own rules prescribe the additional safeguards. ''Sl Univer-
sity dismissal procedures can thus be considered such "rules or
understandings that . . . secure certain benefits" and "upon which peo-
ple rely in their daily lives." 52
plaintiff, since -[t]he information communicated outside the medical school goes beyond a factual
statement that Greenhill had failed his junior year, or a mere recitation of academic grades. and
suggests that Greenhill is intellectually unfit to undertake the study of medicine at alU. h. at 8. The
court therefore concluded that the student was entitled to notice and hearing prior to such stigmatiza-
tion.
Since the Supreme Court assumed a liberty interest at stake in Horowit: (and nevertheless found
that procedural due process protections were unnecessary), it is an open question %% hethereven the'. ct)
limited protections of Greenhill survive the broadly written Horowit: opinion. Grcenhill should
survive. however. sincethe Court's emphasis in Horowitz was upon a uni% crsity's academic expertise in
student dismissals, whereas such academic expertise is not implicated in the release of derogatory
characterizations of the dismissed student (as opposed to statements that a student has been dismissed
for failure to meet the academic standards of the school). Indeed, none of the Eighth Circuit judges
voting to grant the University of Missouri's petition for rehearing en bane in Iloroswit: criticized the
Greenhill decision: instead they found Horowitz factually distinguishable because there had been no
public disparagement of Charlotte Horowitz" intellectual capacity. 542 F.2d at 1335.
Exen the surxival of such an exception to the noninterventionist policy of Horowitz will most
likely be of quite limited value. however. for the most serious injury to dismissed students in terms of
foreclosed educational and career opportunities is likely to stem from the fact of the dismissal itself
rather than from any characterization of its basis. See Dessem. supra note 4. at 287 n.74, In today's
competitih e educational and job markets, second chances for failed students are the exception rather
than the rule.
46. 435 U.S. at 92 n.8.
47. 347 U.S. 260 (1954).
48. 354 U.S. 363 (1957).
49. 435 U.S. at 92 n.8.
50. See. e.g.. Note. Hiolations by Agencies of Their Own Regulations. 87 H ,Rv.i. L. RE%,. 629
(1974).
51. Warren %. National Ass'n of Secondary School Principals. 375 F. Supp. 1043. 1048 (N.D.
Tex. 1974). Contra. Ryan v. Aurora City Bd. of Educ.. 540 F.2d"222 8-29 (th Cir. 1976). cert.
denieL 429 U.S. 1041 (1977): Winnick v. Manning.460 F.2d 545.550 (2d Cir. 1972). See also Behagen
.ntercollegiate Conference of Faculty Reps.. 346 F. Supp. 602.606 (D. Minn. 1972).
52. Board of Regents%. Roth. 408 U.S. 564.577(1972).
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Even if school dismissal procedures are not found to create protected
procedural rights as a matter of constitutional law, a college or university,
once it has adopted such rules, should be held to them. The Court in
Horowitz assumed that the decision to dismiss Charlotte Horowitz
implicated a constitutional liberty or property interest, 53 but nevertheless
concluded that because of "the evaluative nature of the inquiry and the
historically supported interest of the school in preserving its preseilt
framework for academic evaluations ' 54 the requirement of a dismissal
hearing would represent "judicial intrusion into academic decisionmak-
ing."55 Horowitz can therefore be seen as creating a defense or excuse for
the refusal of public universities to hold hearings that would otherwise be
constitutionally mandated. When, however, the "historicjudgment"5' of
educators at a particular university has been to require academic dismissal
hearings, "judicial intrusion" would be at a minimum and the defense of
academic expertise should be considered waived.
Even if one agrees with Justice Rehnquist that judges are not
competent to impose academic dismissal procedures upon public higher
education and that questions of academic dismissal do not lend themselves
to resolution by traditional constitutional due process procedures, a
university's promulgation of predismissal procedures represents a state-
ment by academic experts of those procedures considered best suited to
academic dismissals at that particular school. The Supreme Court's
analysis of a university's failure to follow its own procedural predismissal
rules is, therefore, incomplete. It fails to recognize that such rules-
determined by the very academic experts to whom the Horowitz majority
otherwise pays such deference-are the best available evidence of a fair
academic dismissal policy.
II. THE RIGHT TO AN ACADEMIC DISMISSAL
HEARING UNDER STATE LAW
Although the Supreme Court has refused to require academic dismis-
sal hearings under the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution, such hearings may nevertheless still be required under state
law. Three possible state law theories that may still be used to establish a
legal right to academic dismissal hearings will now be explored."
53. 435 U.S. at 84-85. In many states an equally strong argument can be made for the recognition
of a constitutionally protected property interest in highereducation. See. e.g., Go,.s'. I ope/.419 V.S.
565 (1975); Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ.. 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cr.). cert. d'nied. 365 1,S, 931(
(1961).
54. 435 U.S. at 86 n.3.
55. Id. at 92.
56. Id. at 90.
57. A right to academic dismissal hearings may also be secured by other method%. F xternal
regulation by the federal or state governments or by private accrediting a.sociations has been %uggested
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A. State Constitutional Law
An area of increasing interest and significance for both legal com-
mentators and practitioners is the use of state law, particularly state
constitutional law, for the vindication of human rights and as an alterna-
tive to the protection afforded such civil liberties by the United States
Constitution."8 Thus, in the wake of recent decisions of the United States
Supreme Court, state supreme courts have ruled that, although the United
States Constitution may not protect a particular interest, the same right is
nevertheless secured under the applicable state constitution.59 Now that
the Supreme Court has ruled that academic dismissal hearings are not
mandated by the fourteenth amendment, state constitutional law may well
be invoked by students desirous of predismissal hearings.
Students attempting to establish a right to academic dismissal hear-
ings under state constitutional law can rely upon either the due process
clauses contained in state constitutions0 or the detailed educational
provisions also frequently found in state constitutions. 61 To achieve
procedural protections under the due process clauses of state constitu-
tions, students must first establish either protected liberty or property
interests; since, however, the courts have uniformly found constitutional
liberty or property interests implicated in school disciplinary dismissals, 62
as a possibility for effectuating student protections. Comment, Consumer Protection and ffigher
Education-Student Suits Against Schools, 37 Omo Str. L. J. 608.632-33(1976). Othercommenta-
tors have considered the application of the law of trusts or fiduciaries to the student-university
relationship. Goldman, The University and the Liberty of Its Students-A Fiduciary Theory.54 Ky. L
J. 643(1966): Project. An Overview: The Private Universitvand Due Process, 1970 DUKE L. 795.806.
while at least one author has found all existing theories of law inadequate to govern this relationship
and has therefore proposed a "unitary theory" of student-school relations. Note, The Student-School
Legal Relationship: Toward a Unitary Theor. 5 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 468 (1971).
Efforts to obtain voluntary adoption of some form of academic dismissal hearingsshould prove
successful at many schools. See Joint Statement on Rights and Freedotns of Students, 54 A.A.U.P.
BtL. 258. 259 (1968): "Students should have protection through orderly procedures against
prejudiced or capricious academic evaluation. At the same time, they are responsible for maintaining
standards of academic performance established for each course in which they are enrolled."
58. See. e.g.. Brennan. State Constitutions and the Protection of lndividual Rights. 90 H Alt%. L.
Ri-v. 489 (1977): Hou~ard. State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Dail of the Burger Court. 62
V x. L. Riv. 873 (1976): Note. Of Laboratories and Liberties: State Court Protectiott of Political and
Civil Rights. 10 G%. L. Ri%. 533 (1976).
59. See the cases collected in the articles cited in note 58 supra.
60. See. e.g.. article I. section 2 of the Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of
1974: article I. section I I of the Virginia Constitution of 1971: article I. section 16 of the Ohio
Constitution of 1851.
61. See. e.g.. article VIII of the Virginia Constitution of 1971: Moore. In Aid of Publi
Education: An AnaIsAi. oft/he Education Article ofthe Virginia Constitution of 1971. 5 U. Ricil. L.
R\v. 263 (197 1).
62. See Goss%. l.oper. 419 U.S. 565 (1975) and the cases cited therein: Dixon %. Alabama State
Bd. of Educ.. 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.). cert. denied. 368 U.S. 930 (1961): Buss. Procedural Due Protess
fior School Di.wipline: Probing the Constitutional Outline. 119 LI. Ps. L. Rrs, 545(1971), Note also
state court decisions finding the right to elementary and secondary education so important that its
financing through local property taxes is violative of state constitutions. Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d
728. 557 P.2d 929. 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976). cert. denied. 432 U.S. 907 (1977): Robinson , Cahill. 62
N.J. 473. 303 A.2d 273. cert. denied. 414 U.S. 976(1973). Contra. Milliken %. Green. 390 Mich. 389.
212 N.W.2d 711 (1973).
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the establishment of state rights or entitlements to higher education should
not prove an insurmountable task.63
The recognition of a right or entitlement to higher education-under
the education or due process clauses of a state constitution or under state
statutory law-will not necessarily guarantee students the right to academ-
ic dismissal hearings.
A state supreme court may recognize such a right yet nevertheless
decide to follow the lead of Horowitz and conclude that state procedural
protections otherwise applicable are inappropriate due to the academic
nature of the underlying dispute.64 This result would not be compelled,
however; since the balancing of governmental and private interests at stake
in an academic dismissal is, under Mathews v. Eldridge,65 an evaluative
and subjective decision, state supreme courts may well reach different
conclusions about the necessity of predismissal hearings under state
constitutional or statutory law.
Such a different outcome at the state level might be based on a
determination that there is a fundamental right to higher education under
state law. State courts may also conclude that, since a state's public
universities have traditionally been closely regulated by the state govern-
ment, the requirement of academic dismissal hearings would not constitute
unjustified judicial interference with school autonomy. The consideration
and weighing of such factors can best be done by state courts familiar with
the constitution, laws, and political structure of a particular state. To the
extent that Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Horowitz is seen to be premised
upon concerns of federalism and the avoidance of due process mandates of
nationwide applicability, 66 the decision becomes less a restriction upon
state courts interpreting their own state laws. 67  Now that the Supreme
63. The establishment of such liberty or property interests will not only create state law
protections for contemporary students, but can also provide a solid basis for fourteenth amendment
hearings if a future Supreme Court balances the societal and personal interests at stake in academic
dismissals differently than did the Court in Horowitz. Cf. Brennan, supra note 58. at 503 (footnote
omitted):
If the Supreme Court insists on limiting the content of due process to the rights created by
state law, state courts can breathe new life into the federal due proce,,s clause by interpreting
their common law, statutes and constitutions to guarantee a "property" and "liberty" that
even the federal courts must protect.
64. Many of the cases cited by the Horowitz majority are, in fact, decisions of state courts,
65. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See note 14 supra.
66. See the quotation from Epperson v. Arkansas. 393 U.S. 97. 104 (1968) in tloro wit that "(b]y
and large, public education in our Nation is committed to the control of state and local authorities,"
435 U.S. at 91. Justice Rehnquist's concern with federalism has been analyzed in Shapiro, vqura note
9, at 315-22.
67. Consider the following analysis of the California Supreme Court in Serrano v, Priest, 18 Cal,
3d 728. 766-67, 557 P.2d 929.951-52, 135 Cal. Rptr. 367-68 (1976). cert. denied 432 US, 907 (1977)
(footnotes & citations omitted):
We are fortified in reaching this conclusion [that the Supreme Court's decision on public
school financing under the United States Constitution in San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I (1973), does not foreclose a diferent result under the
California Constitution] by language appearing in the Rodriguez decision itself. The high
court, in passing upon the validity of the Texas system under the federal equal protection
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Court has refused to require predismissal hearings as a matter of federal
due process, state constitutional law provides one of the more promising
avenues for students seeking procedural protections in academic
dismissals.68
B. Reliance Upon State Contract Law
Despite the dictum of the Horowitz majority that public universities
are not constitutionally bound to follow their own rules and regulations,69
a strong argument can still be made that an academic dismissal in
contravention of a school's published policies and procedures constitutes a
breach of contract. "Until the early 1900's, the relationship between the
student and the institution was expressly stated in a written enrollment
contract, which was essentially a business agreement between the parent of
the student and the institution."70 Such express or implied contracts were
commonly found by the courts to justify summary dismissals of students
for alleged academic or disciplinary failings.7  However, if students are
able to successfully enforce such contracts against colleges and universi-
ties, they may be able to gain protections that are now unavailable to them
under the fourteenth amendment.
Under the contract theory of student-university relations, the contract
between the parties is drawn from written documents of the university
(particularly school catalogues and bulletins), as well as from unwritten
policies and understandings that are considered implied terms of the
contract.72 Applying such contract law to an area of great academic
clause, repeatedly emphasized its lack of "expertise" and familiarity with local problems of
school financing and educational policy, which lack "counsel[s] against premature intcrfer-
ence with informed judgments made at the state and local levels." These considerations, in
conjunction with abiding concerns from the standpoint of federalism, in the high court's view
"buttress[ed] [its] conclusion that Texas' system of public school finance is an inappropriate
candidate for strict judicial scrutiny." This court, on the other hand, in addressing the
instant case occupies a position quite different from that of the high court in Rodriguez. The
constraints of federalism, so necessary to the proper functioning of our unique system of
national government, are not applicable to this court in its determination ofw hetherour on
state's public school financing system runs afoul of state constitutional pro% isions,
See also Robinson v. Cahill. 62 N.J. 473.490-91, 303 A.2d 273.282, cert. denied. 414 U.S. 976 (1973).
68. Even if state courts conclude that hearings are inappropriate wshen dismissal is foracademic
reasons, they may nevertheless agree with Justice Marshall's dissent in Horowit: that for the purposes
of judicial review, "academic" dismissals should not include cases in which a student's conduct is at
issue. 435 U.S. at 103-06. See text accompanying notes 22-23 supra.
69. 435 U.S. at 92 n.8. See text accompanying notes 46-56 supra.
70. Note, Contract Law and the Student- University Relationship, 48 ID. L. J. 253.253 (1973).
See also Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ.. 294 F.2d 150. 157 (5th Cir.), cert. deniled. 368 U.S.930
(1961) (reference made to "the well-settled rule that the relations betsseen a student and a prisate
university are a matter of contract"). The relation betwseen a student and a public universit% can also
be considered contractual in nature. Note. supra note 57. at 474.
71. See cases collected in Note, Due Process in Academic Dismissals. supra note4. at 115: Note.
Judicial Review of the University-Student Relationship: Expulsion and Governance. 26 ST %N. L. RE%.
95. 104-06 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Note, Judicial Reviet]: Note. supra note 57. at 475.
72. Note. supra note 70, at 255-59, Note, supra note 57, at475-79. An important implied term in
such student-university contracts may be that the university suill not dismiss or den. the student a
degree for irrational or bad faith academic reasons (a standard similar to the substantise due process
limitation on dismissals from public universities, see text accompanying notes 36.45 supra). Giles% .
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concern and expertise-the admission of a student to medical school-the
Illinois Supreme Court has recently ruled that the allegation of an
unsuccessful applicant that a medical school evaluated his application
upon nonacademic factors rather than upon the basi:; of academic criteria
set forth in the school's bulletin stated a valid cause of action.7" Similar
reasoning could lead courts in appropriate cases to find contracts, either in
school documents or implied therefrom, restricting dismissals to delineat-
ed academic or reasonable nonacademic reasons.
Some courts, however, still refuse to strictly enforce student-
university contracts against universities, especially when the dispute
concerns academic grading or dismissal procedures. The First Circuit
Court of Appeals, for example, has reasoned that
it is apparent that some elements of the law of contracts are used and should
be used in the analysis of the relationship between plaintiffand the university
to provide some framework into which to put the probtem. . . . This d'oes
not mean that "contract law" must be rigidly applied in all its aspects, nor is it
so applied even when the contract analogy is extensively adopted. . . . The
student-university relationship is unique, and it should not be and cannot be
stuffed into one doctrinal category.
The court of appeals therefore refused to construe against the defendant
university an ambiguity in a document establishing a grade appeal
procedure for students, even though the university itself had drafted that
document. This judicial abstention stands in sharp contrast to the
position taken by the federal district judge in this same case: "[T]he Court
cannot refuse to decide whether an enforceable promise has been broken,
simply because the contract is drawn between school and student, particu-
larly when both parties agree that they stand in a contractual relation-
ship."75
Even when both parties to a student-school dismissal dispute do not
agree that an enforceable contract exists between them,76 courts can
Howard Univ., 428 F. Supp. 603, 606 (D.D.C. 1977); Balogun v. Cornell Univ., 70 Misc. 2d 474,477,
333 N.Y.S.2d 838, 841-42 (Sup, Ct. 1971) ("[l]here is no showing that denial of plaintiff's degree was
arbitrary, malicious, capricious, or in any way discriminatory. . . . Abuse of discretion orgross error
hai not been shown.")
73. Steinberg v. Chicago Medical School, 69 lll.2d 320, 371 N.E.2d 634 (1977). See also
Comment. supra note 57; Comment. Educational Malpractice, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 755 (1976).
74. Lyons v. Salve Regina College, 565 F.2d 200,202 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 971
(1978) (quoting Slaughter v. Brigham Young Univ. 514 F.2d 622, 62 (10th Cir. 1975)). A similar
conclusion was reached in Sofair v. State Univ. of N.Y. Upstate Medical Center College of Medicine,
54 App. Div. 2d 287, 292, 388 N.Y.S.2d 453, 456 (1976), appeal denied, 41 N.Y.2d 803, 393 NYS.2d
1027 (1977): "[L]iteral adherence to internal rules will not be required when the dismissal rests upon
expert judgments as to academic or professional standards and such judgments are fairly and
nonarbitrarily arrived at."
75. Lyons v. Salve Regina College, 422 F. Supp. 1354, 1359 (D.R.I. 1976), rev'd, 565 F.2d 200
(Ist Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 971 (1978).
76. Disagreement between the student and university over the exist.nce of a contract is a maior
impediment to the application of contract law to the student-university relationship. "Contract law.
developed 'primarily to resolve conflicting individual interests.' cannot sati ,factorily accommodate 'lie
competing interests of groups, individuals, and society.' Moreover, the faculty, students, and
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appropriately employ contract law doctrines to protect the justifiable
expectations of both the student and university involved. For enforce-
ment of student-university contracts to protect students, however, courts
must consider the substance rather than the form of such contracts and
recognize the usual imbalance in bargaining power between student and
university. The courts should also recognize that almost all written
portions of the parties' contract will have been drafted by the university.77
The enforcement of such contracts would merely hold universities to an
even-handed application of those procedures that they, the academic
experts, have found to be fair and necessary when a student is threatened
with academic dismissal. Such contractual enforcement could provide
valuable protection for students threatened with academic dismissal, now
that the Supreme Court, in Horowitz, has refused to extend to them the
protections of the fourteenth amendment.
C. The Law of Private Associations
As with contract law, and in contrast to state constitutional and
statutory law, the law of private associations may provide students at
private colleges and universities with a basis upon which to obtain notice
and hearing prior to academic dismissal. Although traditionally applied
to such private associations as churches, labor unions, social clubs, and
professional associations, several legal commentators 8 have argued that
the law of private associations, which is "concerned with the problem of
protecting individuals from arbitrary and abusive exercise of power by
organized groups of which they are members, 79 shotild also be applied to
the relationship between students and private universities. Indeed, the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Dixon v. Alabama State Board of
administrators at a university certainly do not view their activities in contractual terms." Note,
Judicial Review, supra note 71, at 105 (footnotes omitted).
77. Schools should not be able to avoid contractual responsibilities simply by stating. "The
Bulletin is not to be regarded as a contract." Comment, supra note 57, at 631 n.105. See also the
college regulation considered dispositive in Anthony v. Syracuse Univ.. 224 App. Div. 487.489.231
N.Y.S. 435,438 (1928) ("the University reserves the right and the student concedes to the University the
right to require the withdrawal of any student at any time for any reason deemed sufficient to it. and no
reason for requiring such withdrawal need be given."). Professor Seavey called this "a strange
document for a respectable college to prepare and for a court to uphold." Seavey. Dismi.sal of
Students: "Due Process," 70 HARM. L. REv. 1406, 1409 (1957).
Several commentators have suggested that the disparity in bargaining power betwteen student and
university is so extreme that the contract doctrine of unconscionability or adhesion should be applied
to student-school contracts in some instances. Comment, supra note 57, at 616-18: Note. Judicial
Review, supra note 71, at 104-05. Whether or not this principle is relevant to student dismissals for
allegedly academic reasons, other less extreme contract doctrines (such as the resolution of ambiguity
against the drafter of the contract- usually the university) could and should be employed by the
courts. For it is still true that "[t]ypical student cases involving private colleges have manifested a
shocking indifference to a number of considerations which have tempered the law of contracts even in
more commercial fields such as insurance and sales." Van Alstyne. The Student as Universiti
Resident, 45 DEN. L. J. 582, 583 n.1 (1968).
78. Eg., Note, Connon Law Rights for Private Universit' Students: &yond the State Action
Principle, 84 YALE L.J. 120 (1974): Note, Judicial Review, supra note 71.
79. Developments in the Law-Judicial Control of Actions of Private Associations. 76 H,%Rv. L.
REv. 983,989(1963).
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Education," the landmark decision recognizing a constitutional right to
notice and hearing prior to disciplinary dismissal from a public university,
cited state cases dealing with expulsions from a medical society and a labor
union for the proposition that "even private associations must provide
notice and a hearing before expulsion." 8'
Since courts have been reluctant to apply the law of private associa-
tions to institutions of higher education, 82 it is unrealistic to anticipate any
sweeping movement by the courts to apply this legal doctrine to the specific
problem of academic dismissals. Respect for institutional autonomy "
and the question of judicial versus institutional (academic) expertise will
discourage judicial entry into this area. Therefore, the initial reliance
upon the law of private associations is most likely -to occur in the judicial
enforcement of a university's own rules pertaining to academic dismissals.
Judicial review in such cases would merely ensure adherence to those
rules that a university's own academic experts have found necessary to that
university's individual institutional goals. 84 Such enforcement would
reconcile judicial deference to institutional autonomy and expertise with
the competing concern of the law of private associations for the prevention
of arbitrary expulsion of association members. 85
It is unlikely that state courts, in applying the law of private
associations to universities having no academic dismissal procedures of
their own, will mandate the kind of detailed due process procedures
outlined in some of the disciplinary dismissal cases " In all probability,
they will instead be satisfied by a much less formal hearing free of malice or
bad faith.87 Even such informal due process as this, however, may provide
more meaningful protection than would the application of contract law in
such situations.
80. 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
81. Id. at 157.
82. Note, supra note 78, at 140-45; Note, Judicial Review; supra note 71. at 107 n77.
83. This respect for educational and institutional autonomy is apparent in the majority opinion
in Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 91. The tradition of independence in private ligher education in the United
States, cf. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (18 19), may result in even greater
deference to institutional autonomy when the challenged academic dismissal is from a private univer-
sity.
84. See text accompanying notes 46-56 supra.
85. In addition to the questions of an organization's interest in its autonomy, of the practical
limitations on judicial review, and of the alleged harm to the individual and to society. courts prior to
judicial intervention into the otherwise private affairs of an organization haxe also considered whether
extrajudicial methods ofcontrol are available, whether the association c: n be said to posess monopoly
power, and whether the association is operating under a governmental grant of rights or powers.
Developments in the Law-Judicial Control of Actions of Private Asyociations. 76 HARv. L, Rtv,
983,990-94(1963). An analysis of these latter factors also argues for application of the law ol private
associations to college and university dismissals. See generally Note. supra note 78: Note. Judicdal
Review, supra note 71.
86. See the discussion of due process procedures in school disciplinary hearings in D. Kim, & M,
YUDOF, EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW 195-97 (1974); Buss, supra note 62, See atso the various
hearing requirements considered and imposed in the multitude of school disciplinary cases cited in
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 n.8 (1975).
87. In his classic article on the law of private associations, Professor Chatee proposed three tests
for determining the legality of an expulsion: "(1) the rules and proceec;ings must not be contrary to
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In cases in which the courts cannot merely enforce a university's own
rules, immediate acceptance of even a relaxed standard of review seems
unlikely. There are, however, indications that some courts may
eventually move in this direction. A recent example of judicial
application of the law of private associations to an area into which the
courts had previously refused to intervene is found in Ezekial v. Winkley.
In this 1977 decision the California Supreme Court held that a surgical
resident at a private teaching hospital was entitled to "fair procedure" (that
is, notice and hearing) prior to dismissal from the hospital's residency
program. The court recognized this right, which had previously been
applied to access to staff privileges at California hospitals, because the
plaintiff's dismissal from the hospital's residency program would, as a
practical matter, have prevented his acceptance into any other surgical
residency program in the state.89 The supreme court therefore found the
plaintiff's expulsion to have the same practical effect as an expulsion from
a professional society or labor union, to which the California courts had
previously applied the law of private associations. The court described
these groups as "private entities [that] possess substantial power either to
thwart an individual's pursuit of a lawful trade or profession, or to control
the terms and conditions under which it is practiced. '90
The rationale of Ezekial can also be applied to cases in which students
are threatened with expulsion from undergraduate, graduate, or profes-
sional schools. At her trial, Charlotte Horowitz offered testimony that
her chances for a medical career had been destroyed by her expulsion from
the University of Missouri-Kansas City Medical School, 91 and it should be
clear that expulsions from other programs of higher education could have
92
a similar effect. Although the argument for medical expertise at a
teaching hospital is at least as convincing as the argument for academic
expertise in dismissals from universities or professional schools, and
although the consequences of nondismissal to hospitals can be grave since
the hospital may remain liable for any medical malpractice committed by a
resident in training,93 the plaintiff in Ezekial nonetheless prevailed.
Despite the similarities to the situation presented in Horowitz, and over
natural justice: (2) the expulsion must have been in accordance i ith the rules: (3) the proceedings must
have been free from malice (bad faith)." Chafee. The InernalAffairs of.Issodathtns Vot for Prolit.
43 HARV. L. REV. 993, 1014(1930). Thus. when there are no rules goserningacademiedismissals.a
university's actions would only be bounded by natural justice ("a sort of unuritten 'due process"
clause," id. at 1015) and bad faith.
88. 20 Cal. 3d 267,572 P.2d 32, 142 Cal. Rptr. 418 (1977).
89. The court found that the completion of an approved residency program is neces-ar to
become a -board certified general surgeon" in California. Seeid. at 274.572 P.2d at 37. 142 Cal. Rptr.
at 423.
90. Id. at 272, 572 P.2d at 35. 142 Cal. Rptr. at 421.
91. Board of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78. 82 n.1 (1978).
92. See Dessem. supra note 4. at 287 n.74.
93. Ezekial v. Winkley. 20 Cal. 3d 267. 283-84. 572 P.2d 32.42. 142 Cal. Rptr.418.428(1977)
(Mosk, J., dissenting).
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the dissent of one of their fellow justices who warned that "competency of a
medical resident can best be determined by the hospital chief of staff who
supervises his training rather than by judges," 4 a majority of the
California Supreme Court held in Ezekial that notice and hearing must
precede dismissal from a private hospital's residency program.
Although cases such as Ezekial v. Winkley, may today represent the
law of private associations at its furthest limits, 95 they indicate the
direction that the law may take in the future as private associations become
ever more powerful in our society. If this trend develops, courts may
eventually invoke the law of private associations to protect students from
arbitrary, capricious, or bad faith dismissals from private universities.
III. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Board of Curators of the Universi,
of Missouri v. Horowitz, although largely comprised of dicta, is now the
law of the land. This article has attempted not only to analyze the Court's
cQnclusions in Horowitz, but also to suggest possible remaining avenues
that may allow students to receive some form of hearing prior to dismissal
from higher education for academic reasons. Regardless of Charlotte
Horowitz' failure to persuade a majority of the Supreme Court that the
fourteenth amendment requires a hearing prior to at least some types of
"academic" dismissals, students in some states should be able to gain such
protection under state law. 96  While the importation of full-scale
administrative due process hearings into academic dismissal decisions may
be inappropriate or counterproductive to the goals of this nation's colleges
and universities, 97 college, graduate, and professional students should at
least be able to obtain an explanation why school authorities consider
them ineligible for further schooling and an opportunity to state their side
of the matter.
Due process by consent-that is, due process pursuant to voluntarily
adopted procedures-is likely to be more meaningful to student and
university alike than due process by command,98 and now that the
Supreme Court has spoken in Horowitz, there will be no federal
constitutional command that schools afford their students academic
dismissal hearings. In some states, however, courts will undoubtedly find
in state constitutional, statutory, or common law the requirement for such
hearings under certain circumstances. Such state court decisions can
94. Id. at 283. 572 P.2d at 42, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 428.
95. See id. at 280, 572 P.2d at 40, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 426.
96. The possibility of securing such protections by regulation of the federal government or
private accrediting associations has also been suggested. See note 57 stupra,
97. See generally Kirp, supra note 17.
98. Id.
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provide a backdrop of minimal procedural protections for those instances
in which a school's own academic dismissal procedures prove inadequate.
The differing requirements that will result from such decisions may also
provide some evidence to support or disprove the major premise of the
majority opinion in Horowitz-that the judicial requirement of academic
dismissal hearings is an unjustifiable interference with the processes and
independence of American higher education.
Although such evidence might someday prove helpful in persuading a
future Supreme Court to strike a different balance among the interests at
stake in an academic dismissal, for the immediate future the federal
constitutional issues implicated in such dismissals have been resolved.
Student arguments for procedural protections in academic dismissal
situations must now be addressed primarily to the state courts and to the
teachers and administrators in whom the Horowitz majority has placed
such confidence.
